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Dickinson Law Review
Volume XXXV OCTOBER, 1930 Number 1
The Manufacturing Exemption From
The Capital Stock Tax
The legal test of what constitutes a manufacturing
operation, so as to entitle the property invested therein to
exemption from the Pennsylvania capital stock tax in ac-
cordance with the proviso contained in Section 21 of the
Act of June 1, 1889,1 as finally amended by the Act of April
25, 1929,2 has not been easily susceptible of consistent ap-
plication.
The purpose of the manufacturing exemption was un-
doubtedly to encourage new industries to locate in Penn-
sylvania.3 It is interesting to keep this purpose in mind
in studying the various decisions construing the exemption
proviso.
The word "manufacturing" has been used in many
Ip. L. 420.
2P. L. 657, which reads "and provided further, That the provisions
of this section shall not apply to the taxation of the capital stock
of corporations, limited partnerships, and joint-stock associations,
organized for laundering, for the processing and curing of meats,
their products and by-products, or for manufacturing purposes, which
is invested in and actually and exclusively employed in, carrying on
laundering, the processing and curing of meats, their products and
by-products, or manufacturing within the State * * *".
3Com. v. Custer City Chemical Co., 16 Dauphin 46, 49; H. M. Rowe
Co. v. Beck, 131 Atd. 509, 511 (Md.), where the court said, with respect
to the manufacturing exemption, "The purpose and intent of such
statutes as those under consideration is to augment the wealth and
prosperity of the State by inducing the establishment, expansion, and
development of industries which will produce by hand or mechanical
labor, in commercial quantities, articles suitable or desirable for the
necessities, comfort, convenience or pleasure of the public, afford
employment to its own citizens and attract others whose skill and
industry will add to its wealth and resources
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statutes and defined in scores of cases. A representative
definition of the term as used in the statute under consider-
ation is to be found in Commonwealth v. Weiland Packing
Company,4 where the court, at page 449, quoted from 26 Cyc.
520, as follows: "Manufacturing is: (1) the application of
labor or skill to material whereby the original article is
changed to a new, different and useful article, provided the
process is of a kind popularly regarded as manufacture or
the product of such process".
Again at page 450: "* * * Or, in other words, the pro-
cess of manufacture brings about the production of some
new article by the application of skill and labor to the
original substance or material out of which such new
product emerges. If, however, there is merely a super-
ficial change in the original materials or substances and no
substantial and well-signalized transformation in form,
qualities and adaptability in use, quite different from the
originals, it cannot properly and with reason be held that
a new article or object has emerged,-a new production
been created".
In the older case of Norris Brothers v. Commonwealth,5
the court said, page 496, "It generally consists in giving
new shapes, new qualities or new combinations to mat-
ter * * *"
Probably the most liberal decision on what constitutes
"manufacturing" is to be found in Commonwealth v. Filbert
Paving and Construction Co.6 This case was decided in 1910
and since then the courts have been careful not to extend
its application. In fact, since this decision there has been
rather a notable judicial tendency to discourage the con-
stant effort to spread the application of the exemption.
Briefly stated, the Filbert Paving and Construction Co.
was engaged in the building of concrete roads and concrete
and asphalt floors. In reaching the conclusion that such
operations constituted manufacturing, the lower court
'292 Pa. 447.
527 Pa. 494.
6229 Pa. 231. Accord People ex rel. Fruin-Bambrick Paving Co.
v. Knight, 90 N. Y. Supp. 537.
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seems to have been impressed by the fact that what was
done resulted from the mixing and preparing in combina-
tion some or all of the following ingredients: cement, sand,
crushed stone, cinder, asphaltum, asphalmistic, bitumen,
silica grit, carbonate of lime, petroleum residuum and va-
rious coloring materials. The result was, of course, a new
composite substance distinct from any of its ingredients.
While this alone would not make the process manufactur-
ing, the appellate court apparently adopted in aid of its
conclusion the following very broad definition as applied
by the lower court :7 "A term employed to designate the
change or modification made by art or science in the form
or substance of material articles in the view of rendering
them capable of satisfying some want or desire of man; and
manufacturing industries consist in the application of art,
science or labor to bring about certain changes or modifica-
tions of already existing materials. It includes all branches
of industry, with the exception of fishing, mining and such
industries as have for their object to obtain possession of
material products in the state in which they are fashioned
by nature".
And on page 63: "The original meaning of the word
'manufacture' (made by hand) has been greatly enlarged by
statutory enactments and judicial interpretations until it is
now generally understood to include 'every product fab-
ricated by the hand of man by his act or his skill, the labor
which he directs or the machinery which he controls' ".
While these definitions seem too broad to be scien-
tifically accurate, it is still questionable whether even their
adoption justified the conclusion reached. The definitions
had to do solely with "articles" or "products". Do these
terms not apply to personal property only? Can they be
construed to include real estate? When a concrete pave-
ment or road is laid it becomes real estate. The same is
true of a floor.
The manufacturing exemption, we must remember, was
intended to encourage new industries to locate in Penn-
712 Dauphin 57, 64.
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sylvania. Is this purpose furthered by the Filbert decision?
The fact that it is not is, of course, not conclusive that a
real estate improvetnent may not constitute a manufactur-
ing operation, but it is, at least, persuasive when it is con-
sidered that it is the first Pennsylvania appellate court de-
cision taking this view.8 A prospective manufacturer of
silk may well consider whether it would be more ad-
vantageous to locate in Pennsylvania or New Jersey, but a
road construction company has no choice as to where a
road is to be built.
As might have been expected to happen much sooner,
the court in the case of Commonwealth v. Wark Company
was asked to extend the exemption, under the doctrine of
the Fiibert case, to include general building and construc-
tion work; that is, the erection of buildings of all types,
whether of reinforced concrete, brick, stone, sheet metal,
frame or what not. In fact, the appellant company argued
that it did not require an extension of the principle of the
Filbert case to hold that the exemption embraced the con-
struction of buildings.
In the Filbert case the concrete pavement was laid
horizontally. In the Wark case the concrete was poured
into molds, or forms, and took shapes both horizontal and
8In the lower court case of Com. v. William Swindell & Bros.
Co., 22 Dauphin 184, the court held that the making of large "gas-
producers and furnaces" was a manufacturing operation. The com-
pany assembed its materials on the ground-structural steel, steel
plates, rough iron castings, fire brick, fire clay, sand, cement and
wooden forms-and then constructed a furnace or gas producer. The
court found as a fact that "they are of a size so large and of a weight
so great that it would be impossible to ship the same after com-
pletion". Thus, they apparently became immovables which could not
be considered articles of commerce in the popular sense, although
the Commonwea.th always took the view that they were machines;
the court having defined a gas-producer as "a machine for making
artificial gas", which machines were simply too large to be portable
under present means of transportation.
932 Dauphin 286, affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pa., June
21, 1930 (not yet reported). This case held that the erection of con-
crete and other buildings was an act of construction as distinguished
from a manufacturing operation.
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vertical. It took a much greater degree of skill to lay or
set the concrete above the ground whether in horizontal
or vertical shapes than on the ground in horizontal form.
The result seemed almost inevitable that the court to be
consistent would have to hold that such building operations
constituted manufacturing.
The lower court, in its well considered opinion, criti-
cized the Filbert decision for applying what appeared to be
an erroneous rule as to the burden of proof in exemption
cases. The Filbert Company alleged that its operations
were manufacturing; the Commonwealth that they were, at
least in large part, construction as distinguished from
manufacturing. The court held that the burden was on the
Commonwealth to prove what part of the operations was
not manufacturing. All other decisions on this question
hold that exemptions from taxation are to be construed
strictly and that the burden of proof is on the company
claiming the exemption to show what part of its operations
is entitled to it.'0 The court, after making it quite clear
that it did not agree with the Filbert decision, stated that
it would not be responsible for extending its effect beyond
the letter of its terms.
The lower court in the Wark case, however, was bound
by the decision in the Filbert case whether it agreed with
it or not; hence, it attempted to distinguish it on the ground
that the Filbert Company had its own "plant" where it
"manufactured" the products which it then used in making
cement floors, asphalt floors, pavements, roadways and
structural concrete. The possession of a "plant" seemed to
have some importance, since the exemption proviso read,
in part, "it being the object of this proviso to relieve from
State taxation only so much of the capital stock as is in-
vested purely in the * * * manufacturing plant and busi-
ness".
' 0 Callery's appeal, 272 Pa. 255; Academy of Fine Arts v. Phila.
County, 22 Pa. 496; Com. v. Sunbeam Water Co., 284 Pa. 180; Corn.
v. Lackawanna 1. & C. Co., 129 Pa. 346; Com. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 151 Pa. 276; Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 29 Pa. 226; Harrisburg
v. Cemetery Association, 293 Pa. 390.
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It is questionable, however, whether this factor really
had much to do with the decision in the Filbert case. The
language of the Supreme Court is very vague and, as the
lower court in the Wark case said, "loose". For an opinion
which had so much pioneering to do, Mr. Justice Elkin's is
not a fortunate one. You may read it through and not
know what the business of the Filbert company was. Its
actual operations are neither described nor mentioned. The
opinion lays great emphasis upon the fact that the word
"manufacturing" was contained in the purpose clause of the
charter. The court states that presumptively this made the
appellant a manufacturing company and, hence, lead di-
rectly to the application of an erroneous rule as to the
burden of proof. As a matter of fact, the inclusion of the
word "manufacturing" in a purpose clause means almost
nothing in the determination of such an issue as was before
the court, particularly in the case of a Delaware corpora-
tion. It is very doubtful, therefore, whether the Supreme
Court did not assume rather than determine that the opera-
tions of the Filbert Company constituted manufacturing.
Later attempts to justify the Filbert decision have em-
phasized the fact that the company had a plant for pro-
ducing the products used in its construction work. In this
connection reliance is placed upon the cases of Common-
wealth v. Keystone Bridge Co. 1 ' and Commonwealth v. Pitts-
burgh Bridge Co. 2 There is little likeness between the pro-
cesses in the two classes of cases. The decisions in the
bridge cases are predicated upon the fact that the companies
themselves manufactured the component parts of the
bridge, and, in the opinion of the court, a manufacturer has
a right to dispose of his product even if the profitable dis-
position includes its assembly in place for the purchaser.
It would be unfair, in such a case, to consider the manu-
facturing process broken at any given point. The erection
of the bridge was thus merely the completion of what was
11156 Pa. 500.
12156 Pa. 507.
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admitted by all to be a manufacturing process."-
To apply this as an analogy to the process by which
either roads or houses are built of concrete would seem, to
resort to a homely expression, to represent an attempt to
make the "tail wag the dog". Possibly every construction
company, whether of roads or buildings, has some sort of
"plant", in a sense. It must in some way prepare the in-
gredients which form the raw materials going into the
construction of the road or building. It may do it in a plant
detached from the construction operation, or it may do it in
an improvised plant on the ground. To make the test of
manufacturing depend upon whether it adopts the one
method or the other would seem to represent a resort to a
most unsound criterion to determine whether the building
of the road or the house is a manufacturing operation.
As a matter of fact, a company engaged in constructing
reinforced concrete buildings or concrete roadways never
has a "plant" in the sense that the Keystone Bridge Com-
pany had. The latter really manufactured the component
parts of the bridge; such as, beams, girders, rods, bolts,
etc. The assembly in place by it of these component parts
made their sale easier. In the Wark and Filbert cases,
component parts, as such, were not produced for the gen-
"sThis is made clear by the opinion of the lower court where Judge
McPherson distinguishes such a case from the construction of houses
and says, page 502 of Supreme Court Report, "It is quite true that in
common speech we do not say that a bridge or viaduct or house or
roof is manufactured, but built or erected or constructed, and it might
perhaps be true that a corporation, whose only business was the erec-
tion of such structures after the parts had been fashioned and fitted
by others, would not be accurately described as engaged in 'manu-
facturing'. However that may be-and the question is not free from
doubt-the case before us is very different. The defendant is un-
questionably a manufacturing company up to the point when the
various parts-beams, girders, rods, bolts and the rest--are ready to
be put together in order to form the complete structure for which
they were intended. The preparation of these parts from material,'
either raw or unfinished, is clearly manufacturing within any accepted
definition of the word; and if in all cases the transaction was finished
by a sale of the parts to a purchaser who would himself put them to-
gether and thus complete the structure for use, the exclusively manu-
facturing character of the corporation could not be questioned".
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eral market. In order to lay the pavement or erect the
building, these companies simply had to "mix" or "prepare"
certain ingredients as required by the particular specifica-
tions under their contracts.
The Supreme Court's opinion in the Wark case makes
no attempt to distinguish it from the Filbert case; in fact,
it makes no reference to it. Nor does there appear to be
any other ground upon which the Filbert and the Wark
cases can be distinguished. It will do to say that the road-
way consists entirely of concrete and is a complete product
in itself when finished, while the apartment house consists
only in part of reinforced concrete, because in the Filbert
case floors were laid and they do not in themselves con-
stitute a complete "article" or "product". In the case of
many manufactured articles certain component parts are
independently manufactured.
The court may have been influenced somewhat in reach-
ing its decision in the Filbert case by the fact that the
State and its political subdivisions must pay for the con-
struction of practically all roadways and, if the operations
were not held to constitute manufacturing, the tax would
simply be passed on to the public, resulting largely in a
useless accounting procedure. This, however, could have
nothing to do with the legal question involved and, from all
that appears of record, had nothing to do with the decision.
How, then, are we to determine what constitutes
manufacturing within the meaning of the statute? There
are several reliable guides.
Any sound test of the meaning of the word manu-
facturing, keeping in mind the purpose of the exemption,
would seem to comprehend the character of the thing pro-
duced as well as the method or process by which it is pro-
duced. As stated by the lower court in the Wark opinion:
"Out attention has been attracted to the fact that in prac-
tically all of the cases, the definitions deal with something
movable, merchantable, and that passes by delivery; and in
a number of cases in defining manufacture, the word
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 9
'article' is used".' Thus the thing produced must be per-
sonalty, a movable, a portable article of commerce. If it
were otherwise, how could the purpose of the statute be
accomplished? If the Pennsylvania Department of High-
ways contracts for the building of a concrete road through
Clearfield County, the contractor has no choice as to where
he shall carry on his operations.
Then, too, in determining whether a given operation is
manufacturing, regard should be had to the manner in
which the public generally considers it.15 As stated by Mr.
justice Frazer in the Wark opinion, "words in a legislative
enactment are to be taken in their ordinary and general
sense; and unless the act sufficiently explains or qualifies
the terms so as to necessitate an interpretation out of the
current and popular signification, they must be deemed to
have been tised by the Legislature in the former sense".
In City of Lexington v. Lexington Leader Co. 6 the court,
having under consideration the proper definition of the
word "manufacturing" as contained in a tax exemption
statute, said, "Usually that meaning will be attached to
them (words) which correspond with 'the common under-
standing of mankind', in view of the subject-matter in con-
"4Citing Com. v. Sunbeam Water Co., 284 Pa. 180, 181; Corn. v.
Weiland Packing Co., 292 Pa. 447, 450; Norris & Bros. v. Corn., 27
Pa. 494, 496; Tidewater Oil Co. v. U. S., 171 U. S. 210, 216; Columbia
Iron Works v. National Lead Co., 127 Fed. 99. Some of these
"articles" or "movables" are, however, of considerable size. Thus the
Commonwealth has never challenged the decisions of the lower court
in holding that the building of ships is manufacturing. Com. v. Wil-
liam Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co., 1 Dauphin 95, note;
Com. v. Delaware River Iron Ship Building and Engine Works, 2
Dauphin 232; Corn. v. Phila. Repair Co., 21 Dauphin 44.
'In Coin. v. Sunbeam Water Co., 284 Pa. 180, the Supreme Court,
quoted approvingly from the opinion in Com. v. J. Frank Boyer
Plumbing & Heating Co., 23 Dauphin 296, 297, as follows: "The words
of the statute (manufacture) are indeed so familiar in use and mean-
ing that they are confused by attempts at definition. Their first sense
as used is fabrication or composition,-a new article is produced of
which the imported material constitutes an ingredient or part. When
wve go further than this in explanation we are involved in refinements
and in impracticable niceties".
's235 S. W. 31, 32 (Ky.).
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nection with which they are used. In other words, that in-
terpretation is to be adopted which agrees with the popular
sense in which they are used and understood, rather than
according to their scientific meaning; and this is especially
so in the construction of tax laws including exemptions
therefrom * * *"
Is the construction of a concrete road any more "manu-
facturing" in the popular sense than the construction of a
concrete factory building? If only the scientific meaning
of the term were resorted to, possibly the roasting of
coffee 7 or the distilling of water 18 would have been held to
be manufacturing, because experts called to testify can
make the simplest operation sound most complex by de-
tailing in technical terms each chemical or physical change
in the process. Popular meanings were not lost sight of by
the court, however, and the roasting of coffee was viewed
as little more than a cooking process and the distilling of
water as a cleaning process. 9 In the popular sense, are the
laying of pavements and the erection of buildings construc-
tion or manufacturing operations?
As stated by the lower court in the Wark case, "this
Act was amended in 1913 to exempt laundering business.
If the Legislature intended to exempt what is commonly
known as construction business, it could have said so".
Incidentally, the laundering exemption has an interesting
history. An attempt was first made to have the courts
declare launderingto be a manufacturing process.20  Cer-
tainly, it was not such in the popular mind, nor did it meet
the requirements of the definition. Briefly stated, the pro-
cess consisted of making clothes clean rather than of mak-
ing clean clothes. Not discouraged by this rebuff, the
17Com. v. Glendora Products Co., 297 Pa. 305; Com. v. Lowry-
Rogers Co., 279 Pa. 361.
1sCom. v. Sunbeam Water Co., 284 Pa. 180.
2"It is not the purpose of this article to review all the decisions in-
volving the Pa. manufacturing exemption. They will be found collect-
ed, with a brief statement of the holdings, in Pa. Corp. Taxes, by
Ruslander & Main, 2nd Edition, pps. 187 to 201.
20Com. v. Keystone Laundry Co., 203 Pa. 289.
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appellant took his case to the Legislature, which, in 1913,1
wrote the laundering exemption in alongside the manu-
facturing exemption.
22
The same thing happened with respect to the process-
ing and curing of beef, ham, bacon, pickled meat, and hides.
This was held not to be manufacturing, 23 within the mean-
ing of the mercantile tax statute. The appellant carried its
case to the Legislature of 1929, and what had originally
been the manufacturing exemption proviso was again
amended and extended to include "the processing and curing
of meats, their products and by-products".2'
There are, of course, great possibilities for the expan-
sion of this policy, so long as unsuccessful appellants have
sufficient influence with the Legislature to secure amend-
ments granting additional exemptions. The courts, on the
one hand, presently seem more disposed than ever to con-
strue the manufacturing exemption strictly. They are not
being confused by technical definitions of terms, nor by
expert testimony which tends to rake simple processes
most complex when scientifically explained. They are keep-
ing in mind popular meanings; the sense in which the Leg-
islature originally used the term manufacturing and the
purpose admittedly desired to be accomplished by it at
that time.
The Legislature, on the other hand, appears to be be-
coming more liberal in its outlook. How long this trend
can be continued without the necessity for legislation im-
posing new or additional taxes is entirely problematical.
It is of incidental interest in this connection, however, be-
cause it is highly probable that the Commonwealth will at
once follow the lead which the court has given it in the
Wark case and begin to tax many operations which seem
not to be manufacturing in the popular sense, but which
appear to meet most or all of the other requirements of the
usual definitions of the term.
2tp. L. 903.
t2Note 2, supra.
23Com. v. Weiland Packing Co., 292 Pa. 447.
24Note 2, supra.
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Some of these now doubtful operations the Common-
wealth had exempted upon its own construction of the law,
others had received the sanction of the lower court 5 only
and will probably, in effect, be retried. If the cases should
be lost on retrial, the unsuccessful appellants would still
be able to try their good fortune with the Legislature, as
did the laundry and meat interests. Assuming that the ex-
emption is doubtful in a given case, it would seem that the
Legislature rather than the courts should decide to grant
it, and apparently this method of solving these problems
can be seem in the trend of recent court decisions and legis-
lative enactments.
25The dyeing of cotton and woolen goods (which goods were
manufactured by others) is commonly referred to as the dyeing busi-
ness, but the lower court has held it to be a manufacturing process;
Com. v. Quaker City Dye Works, 5 Pa. C. C. 94; Com. v. Littlewood
& Sons, 44 Pa. C. C. 310.
The repairing of ships had been held to be manufacturing by the
lower court; Com. v. Phila. Ship Repairs Co., 21 Dauphin 44.
The preserving of fruit was held to be manufacturing in Com.
v. Ritter Conserve Co., 1 Dauphin 97, note.
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